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 Spy, track and archive. The temporality of visibility between JORA and EURO-
SUR. 
(forthcoming in Security Dialogue, approved on February 6, 2018) 
Abstract: 
This article focuses on the temporalities of visibility that is at stake in the functioning of two map-
ping-monitoring softwares devised by Frontex EUROSUR and JORA. Through a study of border 
practices and security devices that builds on interviews and direct observation, the article shows that 
while these systems elaborate on data and information collected in real-time, they work as archives 
for generating future migration risk scenarios and not for border surveillance purposes. After illustrat-
ing in detail the functioning and the modes of visualisation of JORA and EUROSUR, the article takes 
into account how national police officers, Frontex and the Navy use these devices, and how risk 
analyses are produced.  The articles demonstrates that these monitoring-mapping devices are sus-
tained by coeval temporalities: the detection of migrants “on the spot” coexists with a future-oriented 
temporality and with an archival one. The second part of the article analyses the impact that mapping-
monitoring softwares have on migrant journeys and migrant lives. It concludes by bringing attention 
to the ways in which migrants in part strategically appropriate and twist the temporality of security 
and the field of visibility enacted by these devices. 
Keywords: 
Eurosur, temporality, visibility, Jora, Mediterranean, migration. 
Introduction:  
The real-time detection of “illegal” migrant border crossings is an activity performed daily by the 
national police, military forces  – such as the Navy – and European agencies – such as Frontex and 
the European Maritime Security Agency (EMSA) – in order to visually capture “unauthorized” 
movements at the external frontiers of Europe. The detected “irregular” border crossings are trans-
lated into digital interactive maps that have the twofold function of storing data and providing an 
updated situational picture of what happens at the borders of Europe. EUROSUR and JORA are the 
two European migration mapping software systems, both managed by the Frontex agency. They can 
be seen as two complementary targeting gazes on migration, in which the track and archive map-
ping activity is performed according to coeval temporalities, that is to say different temporalities – 
past, present and future oriented – that are simultaneously at play in the crafting of migration risk 
analyses and of preemptive spaces of governmentality. That is, migration movements are simultan-
eously the object of an archival function, of real-time monitoring and of future-oriented risk ana-
lyses: they are spied, tracked and archived through mapping-monitoring software in order to open 
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up future spaces of intervention to make migration a governable phenomenon. The gesture of visu-
alising migrant movements on the map is ultimately part of the datafication of mobility and digital-
isation of the frontier.  
This article does not focus on migration control, nor on visibility in itself. Instead, it deals, firstly, 
with what I call the temporalities of visibility that migration mapping-monitoring devices are pre-
dicated upon, and on the spaces of intervention that are opened up through them relying on an 
archival function. Secondly, it takes into account the impact that these mapping-monitoring devices 
have on the migrants. It investigates the nexus between the temporalities of visibility at play in 
these mapping-softwares and the “spaces of governmentality” (Tazzioli, 2015) opened up through 
the use of these systems – thus, the “co-constitution of temporality and spatiality” (Aradau, van 
Munster, 2012:2). This echoes Derek Gregory’s insight into the articulation between “the space of 
constructed visibility” through digital maps and “the capacity to produce a target” (Gregory, 2010: 
277), arguing that this latter relies on the production of truth claims through which criteria of “risk” 
and/or “dangerousness” are established. However, these do not point to specific targets, but struc-
ture a more general and long-term based state “preparedness” for potential migration threats and 
border stress. I introduce here the expression track-and-archive gaze, that refers to the twofold goal 
of these monitoring devices which consists in detecting migrants in (nearly) real-time and, building 
on the data collected, crafting spaces of intervention that are future-oriented. As Sabrina Ellebrecht 
has remarked, “the virtual network” visualised by software like Eurosur, and Jora is “the medium 
for the creation of a new spatial border” (Ellebrecht, 2014: 240). Hence, the monitoring function of 
mapping devices is of detection and, at once, of “data capture” (Pallister-Wilkins, 2016). As I will 
show later, the activity of data capture is not made primarily for intervening in real-time but for act-
ing out future risk scenarios by enforcing states’ capacities to react against potential “significant 
uncertainties” .  1
The article is structured around two main aspects. It investigates the kind of gaze that is mobilized 
through these mapping devices from the point of view of the temporalities that underpin their func-
tioning. Then, it explores the material effects that this has on migrant lives and movements. The 
first part focuses on the functioning of JORA and EUROSUR, investigating their twofold task – 
monitoring in real-time and storing data for crafting pre-emptive migration risk scenarios. Then, the 
article brings attention to the temporality of migration mapping and monitoring systems, describing 
in detail the multiple epistemologies that sustain them. As I will show, these monitoring-mapping 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Work_programme/2017/1
Programme_of_work_2017.pdf 
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devices are sustained by coeval temporalities: the detection of migrants “on the spot” coexists with 
a future-oriented temporality and with an archival one. The article moves on, interrogating the im-
pact on migrant lives and journeys, analysing how border security is enacted at the level of govern-
ing migration at a distance, and how it dovetails with narratives about human security. It concludes 
by analysing how migrants tactically deal with the condition of being monitored at sea. 
This essay contributes to the academic debate on the relationship between mapping, monitoring 
technologies and the securitisation of borders, exploring the specific temporalities of visibility that 
are at play. The temporalities of visibility of monitoring devices become a lens for understanding 
the spaces of governmentality that these latter open up and, relatedly, the temporality of security 
that is at stake in governing migration at a distance. The argument that I push forward is that migra-
tion mapping software, such as EUROSUR and JORA, is not devised for border surveillance pur-
poses, nor for acting on the spot, but for tracking migration movements, collecting and archiving 
information in order to craft future-oriented migration risk scenarios. From such a perspective I will 
explore how the security of the external frontiers of Europe is conceptualized and how it is enacted 
by states. More precisely, it is the entanglement and the blurring between human security – con-
ceived as the security of the migrants – and border/state security – against migrants – that officially 
sustains and legitimises the implementation of monitoring and mapping tools. Indeed, EUROSUR 
has been presented as a tool “to reinforce border surveillance” and as a “truly European response to 
save the lives of migrants travelling in overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels, to avoid further tra-
gedies in the Mediterranean” . Taking into account two European migration mapping and software 2
systems for tracking and archiving migration movements, EUROSUR and JORA, the article shows 
that the use of mapping-monitoring devices for detecting migrants has concrete consequences not 
only – and not mainly – on the spot, with migrants who can be intercepted at sea in real time, but 
also for implementing measures and political technologies for preventing and obstructing future 
migrant crossing along a certain route. 
The article builds on the literature on the temporality of security that traces differences between on 
the one hand anticipatory knowledges led by a precautionary principle, and, on the other, anticipato-
ry security practices underpinned by a preemptive logics. While the former are grounded on calcu-
lative practices which make it possible to “act before the identified threat reaches a point of irre-
versibility” (Ewald, 2002: 287, cited in Anderson, 2010: 789), the latter are less about prediction, 
and instead concern the “multiple potential futures that are rendered actionable (or liquid) in the 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1182_en.htm 2
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present” (De Goede et al. 2014: 413; see also Anderson, 2010; Aradau, van Munster, 2011; McCul-
loch, Wilson, 2015). That is, unlike precautionary logics, preemptive security technologies are pred-
icated on the fundamental non-calculability of future threats that consequently require specific po-
litical technologies for governing phenomena, that build precisely on their partial unpredictability. 
This piece considers the preemptive rationale which sustains the temporalities of visibility at stake 
migration mapping software, and more precisely the future oriented temporality of the spaces of 
interventions that are crafted by European agencies. This analysis of migration mapping software 
brings a contribution to such a scholarship by focusing on three main peculiar points. First, it points 
to the central role played by the archiving of migratory events in generating future-oriented spaces 
of governmentality. The production of “historical patterns” of migratory events and the data storage 
activity are used not for predicting or calculating forthcoming threats but, rather, for acting out po-
tential and not fully definable migration risk scenarios (Cote-Boucher, 2017).  
Second, it shows that, unlike the temporality of the catastrophe, it is not a question of a “tipping-
point" that migrants’ arrivals could trigger (Aradau, van Munster, 2011) but, rather, of spaces of mi-
gration governmentality crafted for managing the constitutive “migration crisis”, by diverting, 
troubling, and to some extent anticipating migration routes. Third, it contends that differently from 
security practices that “aim to act on threats that are unknown and recognized to be unknowable, yet 
deemed potentially catastrophic” (DeGoede et al. 2014: 415), the government of migration at a dis-
tance is predicated upon defined “risks” – i.e. migrants – whose movements, routes and numbers 
however remain partially unpredictable.  This is not (only) because of the lack of data but also be-
cause of the “incorrigibility” (De Genova, 2010) of migrations and the constitutive impossibility to 
fully govern them, due to migrants’ tactics of appropriation and constant reinvention of strategies of 
movements.  
Such a take on the temporality of security enables clarifying that this essay does not deal with visu-
alisation, nor with visibility per se, but with the temporalities of visibility that are at stake in migra-
tion mapping software. Concurring with the idea that a particular mode of visuality is called up and 
into being in contemporary articulations of sovereignty” (Amoore, 2007: 142), however, the article 
shows that EUROSUR and JORA cannot be fully grasped through the lens of “vigilant modes of 
looking” (144): indeed, this migration mapping software works by producing and storing migratory 
events, combining together different temporalities of visibility and enacting a highly selective gaze. 
Unpacking the temporalities of visibility through a study of mapping devices: 
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JORA and EUROSUR are not tackled here through a comparative approach that aims at finding out 
the differences between these two pieces of software. Rather, both of these mapping-monitoring 
devices work as archives of migrants’ detected movements for generating future-oriented migration 
risk analyses. An investigation of EUROSUR conducted in the light of, and in combination with, an 
analysis of JORA – which actually remains quite unexplored in the academic literature – makes it 
apparent  that real-time intervention is not the goal of these systems. While EUROSUR tends to be 
studied in itself, as a communication network, by focusing on EUROSUR and JORA together it be-
comes possible to bring to the fore the temporality of visibility that is at stake in governing migra-
tion at a distance and the interconnectedness of these mapping-softwares for generating migration 
risk scenarios. 
 EUROSUR has been analysed by scholars in the fields of migration studies and security studies, 
taking into account inter-state relations (Bellanova, Duez, 2016; Jeandesboz, 2011) and the politics 
of control and visibility (Ellebrecht, 2014). However, the temporalities  of visibility that sustain the 3
functioning of these monitoring-mapping devices are quite unaddressed in the literature. Yet, the 
temporalities of visibility are not tackled here simply for the purpose of adding a further analytical 
angle to the literature. Rather, such an angle helps in understanding two mutually related aspects. 
First, it allows us to grasp what these devices do. Second, it makes possible an unpacking of the 
conception of border security that is played out. In other words, the articulation between the tem-
porality of visibility and governmentality is a constitutive one in governing migrants at a distance 
and in performing border security activities; indeed, monitoring-mapping devices such as EUROS-
UR and JORA contribute to the structuring of a field of visibility which opens up multiple spaces of 
intervention to prevent, control and hamper migration movements. More precisely, the coeval tem-
porality of visibility that is performed through monitoring devices makes it possible to intervene at 
a distance to govern migration by anticipating migrant routes, on the basis of data stored, as well as 
by monitoring and intercepting migrants in real time. 
If monitoring and mapping devices are not missing from scholarship on security and migration 
(Jeandesboz, 2011; Heller, Pezzani, 2014; Marin, 2011; Seiffarth, 2012), they are however mainly 
studied through a reading of EU documents or grounded on interviews conducted with the actors 
who manage those dispositives, while there is far less attention paid to their effective functioning. 
In particular, as Dijstelbloem, Van Reekum and Schinkel rightly stress, what is missing in the liter-
ature is a “political topology that is not wholly structured by a ‘surveillance apparatus’, but which 
In the article I use in some places the term “temporalities” as a plural precisely to stress the coexistence of 3
different tempos and functions: real-time detection, archival function, and futures-oriented risk analysis.
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transacts the workings of such an apparatus with migrants, vessels and tactics at sea” (Dijstelbloem 
et al., 2017: 225). At the same time, a burgeoning scholarship has investigated the proliferation of 
border surveillance technologies, ranging from biometric identification controls to smart borders 
and visualisation (Aas, 2005; Bigo, 2002; Dijstelbloem et al. 2017; Muller, 2010; Wilson, Weber, 
2002). Nevertheless, the mapping-monitoring devices I take into account do not work through indi-
vidual encounters between technologies and migrant bodies. Moreover, I approach these mapping-
monitoring devices by shifting away from the primacy of the visual as such, towards an account of 
the mutual constitution of modes of visualisation, temporality of security, and new spaces of inter-
ventions. 
The modes of government that are enacted through these mapping-monitoring systems do not work 
through individualising mechanisms of control: they look at migrants as parts of groups – e.g. 
Xnumber of migrants on a vessel – and as detected migrants’ passages. The detection of migrants in 
real-time is not primarily conducted for border surveillance purposes but to build migration risk 
analyses and envisage preemptive spaces of governmentality that strengthen states’ readiness to po-
tentially react to border pressures and hybrid threats .  This argument could appear in contradiction 4
with the very definition of EROSUR which is the “European Border Surveillance System”. How-
ever, by bringing attention to the discrepancy between real-time detection and the deferral in time 
concerning mapping representation, the notion of border surveillance appears as partially inad-
equate to account for the archival function of EUROSUR and JORA and the production of future-
oriented spaces of governmentality. Second, and relatedly, if we consider the politics of mapping 
that sustains JORA and EUROSUR, it is noticeable that these pieces of software represent neither 
migrants nor migration routes: instead they translate migrants’ detected presences and passages into 
governable events. Such a consideration on mapping goes beyond analyses on visualisation, and 
actually reveals that what matters for EUROSUR and JORA’s purposes is not the representation of 
migration movements per se but, rather, migration risk scenarios, which ground on the archival 
function of these systems. In fact, as I mentioned above, what is at stake is a “track-and-archive” 
gaze which strives to detect and spy on migrants in real-time in order to use such material to craft 
future-oriented migration risk scenarios.  
On a methodological level, this paper is grounded on interviews with institutions and on direct ob-
servations of the functioning of EROSUR and JORA that I conducted between 2014 and 2016. I 
entered the control room of JORA in Pratica di Mare and of EUROSUR in Rome through official 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-completed-first-set-of-vulnerability-assessments-hKB3h4 4
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requests made, respectively, to Frontex and to the EUROSUR National Coordination Point located 
in the Department of Public Security of the Italian Home Office in Rome. Yet, I was allowed to see 
the data visualised only on those days that I entered the monitoring rooms, and to ask for explana-
tions about the way in which data are collected, shared, and visualized. As agreed during the inter-
views, in this paper I won’t show any pictures of EUROSUR and JORA, since it is forbidden to 
take pictures inside the operational rooms. Such an empirical investigation is  combined with a 
methodological approach that, building on the material turn in critical security studies (Aradau, 
2010; Hansen, 2013; Squire, 2015), aims at “politicizing the materiality of security 
technology” (Bourne et al. 2015, p. 308) . This involves conceiving of “border security as practice”, 5
and taking “securitisation not just as a discursive process but at the level of its imbrication in tech-
nological processes” (Walters, 2014b: 102; see also Cote-Boucher, et al. 2014 ). I scrutinize how the 
spaces of governmentality they contribute to are crafted – instead of starting from discourses and 
institutional documents on security and seeing how they are “applied” in practice. 
In this sense, the study of EUROSUR and JORA has been conducted on the basis of an “analytics of 
devices” (Amicelle, et al. 2015; Ruppert, et al. 2013); this latter centres on a Foucaultian conception 
of technology corresponding not to technical tools but to dispositives that generate and sustain prac-
tices and methods for governing subjects. Yet, instead of focusing on how different actors operate at 
the border (Mountz, 2010; Salter, 2012), this article brings a contribution to this literature by invest-
igating the materialities of border security and the ways in which this latter is enacted through a 
specific articulation between temporalities of visibility and spaces of governmentality.  
The coeval temporalities of mapping-software:  
JORA, which was activated in 2011, is “an information system used by Frontex and border guards 
of the EU member states and participating third countries where incidents are registered and vali-
dated by Frontex” .  For the purposes of this article, it is worth highlighting the most relevant dif6 -
ferences between the two pieces of software. Firstly, unlike EUROSUR, whose data are locally val-
idated by each National Coordination Point, JORA is a centralized system – Frontex validates and 
This research has been realized through interviews and visits conducted in Italy with national and European actors in 5
charge of managing migration monitoring and database tools. I visited the Eurosur Italian coordination point based in 
the Italian Home Office in Rome (July 2014, November 2015)  the Frontex headquarters in Catania (November 2016) 
and Rome (January 2016), and interview with the Spanish company GMV (June 2016) and EMSA (August 2016). I also 
conducted interviews with the Italian Navy at the Navy Headquarters in Rome, in March 2014 and in July 2015 and the 
Italian Coast Guard (July 2016) and Doctors without Borders (Rome, August 2017).
http://www.societalsecurity.eu/index.php?page=eu-crisis-management-systems#expand57 6
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manages all data from Warsaw. Secondly, JORA stores information concerning Frontex Joint Oper-
ations only, which can then be  shared with EUROSUR, while this latter contains all data related to 
cross-border crime or irregular migration events spotted at the external frontiers of Europe. Thirdly, 
JORA’s interface is much more complex than EUROSUR's, and more detailed  in its data collec-
tion, due to the different angles through which a certain "migratory event”  is recorded in the sys7 -
tem. Finally, JORA is structured on a multi-level access system, while EUROSUR has only one ac-
cess point. 
January 20, 2016. Inside the monitoring room of Frontex's Italian headquarters in the military air-
port of Pratica di Mare near Rome, a Frontex officer accesses JORA software, entering a secured 
username and password and updating the map with a new migratory event. The “event” in question 
is a migrant vessel rescued by the Navy the day before near the island of Lampedusa: “since the 
event is by now closed, it can be visualized on the map, after being approved by the Frontex main 
headquarters in Warsaw” (Interview 1). After a few seconds a new coloured dot has been displayed 
on the map, containing heterogeneous information and data collected by national authorities and 
Frontex officers: the number of  migrants on board, their nationality, the exact location and time of 
the rescue operation, and the nationality of the suspected smugglers.  
JORA works more as dashboard software than as a monitoring mapping system, and its economy of 
visibility is based on a multi-scalar gaze.  Through such an expression, I refer to the multiple levels 8
that are contained within JORA and that can be accessed simultaneously. Each of these level is 
characterised by a specific regime of visibility that, in turn, helps us to grasp the specific temporal-
ity of security which is played out in these devices. It is formed of five screens, each of them report-
ing a different situated-gaze on migration and grounded on a specific sight epistemology. That is to 
say, each screen generates a certain knowledge on the same migratory event through a specific 
visualisation mode. Importantly, such a sight epistemology includes a certain assemblage of tem-
poralities of visibility – and can be named as a temporal-sight epistemology.  
One screen is formed of coloured dots corresponding to “migratory events” detected in the Mediter-
ranean. By clicking on a dot, the description of the event is displayed and contains information 
about the number of migrants, their nationalities, eventual smugglers arrested and the date and the 
location of the event. Yet, migratory events are not displayed on JORA in real-time but “only when 
“Migratory event” is the technical expression employed by Eurosur and Frontex officers for designating migrant bor7 -
der crossings that are relevant to these systems. 
“JORA has had an important streamlining effect in the way that incidents arising from Frontex operations are pro8 -
cessed. Before JORA, in 2011, FSC was able to process data from only six of the 16 Frontex operations carried out in 
that year” (Frontex, Twelve seconds to decide, 2014, p. 41).
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it is finished and we have all information about it; this means that it could take from 1 to 3 days”  . 9
Thus, this map is based on a what can be called an epistemology of the event which consists in rep-
resenting the occurrence of migrants intercepted or rescued through the data collected about them 
and about the moment of their being detected by radar. A second screen consists in the vessel track-
ing system, but that displays the location of the boats only after a validation step in which data are 
checked. In this case it is a nearly real-time epistemology of sight that is at stake, since it is the 
screen which most approximates the idea of a situational awareness picture. 
A third screen is grounded on an archival “aerial epistemology” (Adey, Whitehead, Williams, 2013: 
13) which is constantly updated in time and generates a temporal narrative of spaces: it consists of a 
set of comparative satellite images, taken from the European Space Agency (ESA): Frontex asks the 
ESA to provide them with satellite images of specific locations taken through the satellites Sentinel 
I and Sentinel II  at different times, in order to see how a certain space has changed over time. For 10
instance, a set of images contained in JORA is of a location on the coast of Sabrata in Libya: the 
satellite image taken in March 2015 shows a more or less void zone, with no relevant movement or 
presence, only few boats on the beach. A few months later (October 2015), an increased number of 
vessels and persons in the same area were detected by the satellite, proving that Sabrata is a migrant 
point of departure with an important smuggler network, crafting in this way a temporal narrative of 
the spatial transformations occurring in a targeted place. Thus, the temporality of visibility related 
to spatial changes potentially opens up a field of intervention that is not only future-oriented but 
also involves a struggle over the spatial economy – in this case, against the economy of smuggling 
– more than punctual actions for intercepting a vessel. Material evidence and traces that mark spa-
tial transformations over time leads Frontex's officers to change action strategies: in the above-men-
tioned case, satellite images of the same place taken at a temporal distance provide evidence of the 
emergence of Sebrata as an important and highly surveilled migration departure point. Therefore, 
targeted places are monitored over time to grasp spatial formations at the “threshold of detectabil-
ity” (Weizman, 2015). Such an expression is used here to refer both to spaces that get relevance due 
to their changed nature, and to the mobile boundaries between objects that are undetected and ob-
jects that are the target of a secret or public gaze. While the politics of targeting individuals, insight-
fully analysed by Gregoire Chamayou, is fundamentally based on a “life pattern” strategy 
http://www.societalsecurity.eu/index.php?page=eu-crisis-management-systems#expand57  9
 These satellites were devised not for detecting migration but for other surveillance purposes. Moreover, as stressed 10
by researchers at the BlueHub research centre of the European Union, these satellites are configured more for monitor-
ing the land than the sea (Skype interview, July 28, 2016).
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(Chamayou, 2015), this is instead grounded on a spatial pattern logic, which takes into account how 
a certain space has transformed over time and how such transformation indicates a change in the 
economy of that place. The final screen of JORA is an archive of the images of the migrant vessels 
intercepted and seized at sea: neither migrants nor migration movements are the main target here 
but the material “logistic of migrant crossing” (Garelli, Tazzioli, 2017). In this case, the temporality 
of visibility that is played out is not related to a specific intervention but, rather, it forms the basis 
and the archive of the states’ knowledge about migrant logistics of crossing. These multiple layers 
of sight do actually also reveal an irreducible heterogeneity of temporalities upon which different 
modes of intervention are structured (Cote-Boucher, 2017). I suggest that it would be misleading to 
encapsulate these multiple temporalities of visibility into a main and dominant one: in fact, it is pre-
cisely the intertwining of an archival function with a future-oriented one that opens up spaces of 
governmentality and strengthens states’ preparedness to potential uncertainties.  
Therefore, each migratory event is apprehended from different angles: as a single event – the dot 
containing information – as a factor that impacts on the level of risk of a certain frontier, or from the 
point of view of the spatial infrastructures that make it possible for an event to occur. In this case, 
the mapping gaze takes migration as a phenomenon to govern, discipline and contain. What is rel-
evant to the functioning of JORA is not the identity of the migrants detected, but the translation of a 
border crossing or of a migrant boat into an “event” and its degree of governability. Ultimately, it is 
the migrant vessel that is targeted as a suspect object, and that it is scrutinized both in its trajectory 
and in its composition. What is relevant at this stage is not the question “who are the migrants on 
board?” but, rather, one of “what is, approximately, the estimated number of migrants on the ves-
sels?” in order to assess the “size” of that event. 
Hence, it is a mapping gaze that does not look at migrants per se, but  instead crafts migratory 
events as phenomena to govern and as a complex of human and non-human elements: the migratory 
event is captured and scrutinized from different spatial scales and through the “logistics 
spaces” (Cowen, 2014: 2) of migration – e.g. the spaces of migrant departures, infrastructures and 
transports. In this regard, William Walters's considerations on “viapolitics” enable the bringing of 
attention to the centrality of vehicles for coming to grips with the contested field of migration gov-
ernmentality: “a focus on the material properties of the mode of transportation […] can illuminate 
how different vehicles and their systems offer limits and possibilities for migration politics” (Wal-
ters, 2014a: 12). Thus, the logistics of migrant crossing that these systems look at and capture is 
what is translated into the abstract spaces of governmentality. In order to hamper migrants from 
!10
crossing the sea and becoming lives to rescue, actually the target of the mapping gaze has to shift 
from the migrants to their logistics of crossing.  
The deferred temporality of migration governmentality at a distance. 
EUROSUR, the European External Border Surveillance System, was launched by the EU in De-
cember 2013: conceived as “the system of the systems” , it has been presented as a tool for build11 -
ing a common pre-frontier intelligence picture of what happens at the external borders of Europe 
and as a mapping database elaborating information logged in different national and European moni-
toring devices and databases . The real-time map picture that EUROSUR is expected to generate is 12
not about any events occurring at the external frontiers, but only of the illegal crossings and border 
crimes happening at the external borders of Europe. What does EUROSUR effectively display on 
the map and how does it represent migrations? 
What the EUROSUR map visualises and represents are neither migration movements nor migrants. 
The EUROSUR screen displays a map of coloured dots, each of them corresponding to a migratory 
event; that is say to an irregular border crossing or to a border-crossing crime. It could be argued 
that EUROSUR structures the form and the meaning of what an event (of concern) is . Neverthe13 -
less, more than the dots signifying the single events, what characterises EUROSUR's map are the 
national coloured borders, whose colours depend on the “level of impact” factor associated with any 
frontier. It is not the number of migration events that have occurred at a certain border that determ-
ines if that frontier will be green (low risk), yellow (medium) or red (high risk) but their “impact”. 
How is the impact factor exactly determined as a combination of multiple migratory events? Po-
licemen who work in National Coordination Centres and manage the system on an operational level 
caution against the tendency to overstate the use of data evidence for establishing levels of risk: “on 
an operational level it is important to highlight that levels of risk and the impact factor cannot be 
deduced from mathematical formula only, and are instead the outcome of a complex political evalu-
“Examining the creation of a European Border Surveillance System”, (MEMO/08/086). See also http://eur-lex.eu11 -
ropa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al14579
In particular, data are taken from: the national databases of the Navy and the Coast Guard, the European Space 12
Agency and Frontex.
In principle any migrant vessel that is detected at sea and that is irregularly entering an EU member state is 13
translated into an “event” and becomes of EUROSUR's concern. 
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ation  which  also includes factors like the geographical position of member states and their exper14 -
ience in managing migration” (Interview 2).   
In fact, the colour of a frontier is not determined in real-time: it is the outcome of an accumulative 
process, that is of individual migratory events taking place at that border which are then detected 
and stored in EUROSUR. When the colour of a frontier changes it is because on a European level, 
and building on Frontex’s risk analysis, “it is established that the border stress that a certain frontier 
experiences due to the migratory pressures has been considerably increased or decreased”. Such a 
decision is not a smooth process; rather, it is the result of a battle between member states and the 
EU, insofar as a red border means receiving much more financial support from the European Com-
mission than if the same border is coloured green. This results in member states tending to put on 
the map as many migratory events of concern as possible, in order to get more financial support. 
The evaluation made about how to colour a certain frontier depends on the elaboration of past 
events stored in EUROSUR, combined with a preemptive approach that, starting from the data col-
lected, envisages future scenarios of migratory risk. Hence, the “border impact” exceeds the border-
line and includes the political and economic effects related to the governability triggered by the 
phenomena and by the apprehension of migrants by national authorities. Levels of risk indicators 
and risk analyses are not conceived for disciplining migration movements but for putting into place 
measures to enhance border stress capacities. 
The use of EUROSUR for producing risk analyses was confirmed to me by Frontex officers at the 
European Regional Task Force Office (EURTF) in Catania, where Frontex works in coordination 
with Europol, Easo and Eunavfor Med, for “the management of migration crises in the most af-
fected areas"  supporting Italian authorities. “Risk analyses are generated elaborating on the mi15 -
gratory trends that EUROSUR visualises and by paying attention to the alterations at the level of 
border impact at different frontiers of Europe” (Interview 3). The EUROSUR Analysis Layer User 
Group is the working group coordinated by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) which is in 
charge of producing a sort of crisis narrative, that is an updated map of the migratory risk scenarios, 
on the basis of data entered into EUROSUR. In this regard, it is important to highlight that 
EUROSUR's visualisation of level of migration risk does actually correspond to the increasing use 
in EU documents of “hotspot” terminology and images: in fact, hotspots pertain to “risk” levels as 
 The arrival of X number of migrants in two different member states does not result in the same impact factor. More14 -
over, the number is not enough for assessing the impact factor: the migrant composition is likewise a crucial element, 
depending on their degree of manageability of the event.
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/eurtf-office-in-catania-inaugurated-fcQoSr 15
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they represent the critical sites along the EU borders that are characterised by migratory events. 
Therefore, the visualisation of migration in terms of level of risk contributes to posit a nexus 
between border (sites) and crisis: hotspots are named for pointing to the need to intervene in situ-
ations of crisis. 
The control rooms of EUROSUR and JORA are based on a highly restricted access which generates 
a closed-circuit visibility: the state gaze on migration – that consists in the modes of visibility em-
ployed by states for detecting and controlling migration – is not of public concern. The archival 
function of the software was stressed by EUROSUR’s officers during my visit at the National Co-
ordination Point in Rome: EUROSUR and JORA make it possible to recover what had been detec-
ted in a specific location and at a specific time in the past – what is technically called “historical 
pattern”, which refers to the possibility to interrogate the archives of the two mapping-monitoring 
devices. This is crucial to the functioning of EUROSUR and JORA not only for crafting the “migra-
tion crisis” narrative, but also for tracing general migration trends.  
By entering the date and the exact location into the computer, the police officer showed me what 
was detected in the Central Mediterranean, in an area close to South-Eastern Sicily on a day that he 
took as a sample. Three red dots indicating a migrant illegal crossing appeared on the screen in cor-
respondence to that geographical area. Yet, when I asked him to recover the history of what had 
happened near the island of Lampedusa on September 6, 2012, he suddenly stopped searching: the 
date I requested in fact corresponded to the day on which a huge “ghost” migrant shipwreck 
happened near Lampedusa and there is still a trial underway against the Italian authorities for the 
failure to assist migrants in distress.  16
The “story” of any dot contained in EUROSUR is the result of a close-up gaze combined with a 
sight at distance: what is displayed on EUROSUR and JORA consists of both what monitoring sys-
tems see – e.g. migrant vessels – and  what is collected on the ground through interviews conducted 
with migrants. Therefore, what is displayed on the map is the result of a migratory event as it is vi-
sually captured over time – e.g. a migrant vessel detected at sea, then during the rescue operation 
and finally upon disembarkation. Only some of the data contained in those map-archives stem di-
rectly from the same systems or other connected to them, while a part of the information visualised 
   This is considered a “ghost shipwreck” by Italian authorities: on September 6, 2012, a boat with 135 Tunisian mi16 -
grants sank a few miles away from Lampedusa. 56 people were rescued, 6 corpses  were recovered some days after, and 
73 are still missing. The Italian Coast Guard has been accused by NGOs of not answering the SOS calls sent by the mi-
grants and for the delay in going to rescue the migrants. http://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2012/09/09/news/
sbarchi_lampedusa-42213505/ 
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is the result of an operation of knowledge extraction, that is migrants who are asked to give details 
about the smuggling network they used and about their journey.  
Human security or border vulnerability ? 
Differently from JORA, which has not been so much advertised by the EU, EUROSUR has been 
promoted by the EU as an information exchange system which enhances the possibilities of “saving 
migrants' lives at sea and fighting cross-border crime” . This ambivalent humanitarian-police task 17
has been criticized by activists and scholars who contend that, actually, EUROSUR has not been 
devised for intervening promptly to rescue migrants at sea (Heller, Jones, 2014). Actually, this ‘hu-
manitarian’ aim was only inserted into the EUROSUR mandate at a late stage, along with the origi-
nal goals of preventing cross-border crime (including human smuggling) and irregular migration. 
These three goals, moreover, amount to much the same thing: ‘intercepting’ and ‘rescuing’ migrants 
at sea” (Andersson, 2016: 12).  
Instead of disputing  the gap between the rhetoric of EU documents and the effective way in which 
EUROSUR is operating, I shift the attention to the temporality of visibility. The real-time gaze is in 
fact the material condition for getting a situational awareness picture of the external borders of Eu-
rope. Yet, scrutinizing not only what is put in EUROSUR, but also how long after a migration event 
is displayed on the map, it becomes clear that prompt intervention is far from being the goal of EU-
ROSUR. The average time of latency between a migration event being added to the map and being 
displayed is of some hours and can reach one day. Such a delay depends in part on the technical 
limits of the system: that is, there is a time required for national Coordination Centers to process 
data. Moreover, as declared by GMV, the Spanish company that is in charge of improving EURO-
SUR, there are still difficulties in visualising too many data and too much information at the same 
time (Interview 4). Nevertheless, the time of latency is also the result of the temporality of interven-
tion that underpins EUROSUR: even if getting a (nearly) real-time situational picture is effectively 
one of EUROSUR's main tasks, it is not according to real-time temporality that EUROSUR works 
and impacts on migrations. Indeed, events of concern are added to the map only once they are con-
cluded – for instance, when a group of migrants intercepted and rescued at sea disembark in Italy.  
 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-578_en.htm  17
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EUROSUR keeps the event open to updates instead of crystallising it once and for all: if after some 
time additional information and data are collected by national authorities about a migration event 
that has occurred, the dot on the screen corresponding to that event is updated. In the main opera-
tional room of the Italian Navy Headquarters in Rome, there is no screen with the EUROSUR map: 
when I entered the room, a Navy officer explained to me the current situation in the Mediterranean, 
pointing to the different screens which displayed the position and movements of boats that had been 
spotted by radar or which showed vessels communicating their own location through the AIS sys-
tem.  One of the screens was displaying instead the images captured by a drone used for monitor18 -
ing the central Mediterranean: “we always work in real-time, the data we receive from coastal or 
naval radar are immediately visualised on the map – while this is not the case with satellite images; 
and it is on the basis of this real-time visualisation that we can also intervene promptly” (Interview 
5). To what extent is EUROSUR used by the Navy in its daily activities? EUROSUR is not a piece 
of software that the Navy employs in search and rescue operations, or for detecting vessels. Rather, 
the Navy is requested to send to EUROSUR the data collected, although as military actors they can 
keep some information secret – such as the locations of their own vessels: “we can access EURO-
SUR, but its usefulness is far more for building an archive that can then be accessed in the future in 
order to address changes in migration trends, than for monitoring and acting in real-time” (Inter-
view 6). 
Hence, the double-edged task of fighting irregular migration and saving migrants’ lives appears as 
radically discordant with the temporality of the effective functioning of EUROSUR that I illustrated 
above. The goal of saving migrants’ lives is increasingly mentioned in Frontex reports, but the way 
in which human security is conceived remains fundamentally vague. To what extent can migrant 
lives be saved? “The functioning of monitoring systems like EUROSUR generates an effect of de-
terrence, discouraging migrants from crossing the sea” (Interview 7). Therefore, human security is 
ultimately conceived in terms of deterrence, that is as measures for preventing migrant departures, 
and deterring them from coming to Europe to seek asylum. The fact that saving migrant lives is 
defined  through a politics of deterrence – not letting migrants cross the Mediterranean – should be 
read as part of a broader tendency, I suggest, which is at stake in EU migration governmentality, in 
particular concerning migrant deaths in the Mediterranean. That is, granting protection to the mi-
grants is equated with preventing them from crossing the sea, without at the same time establishing 
safe channels to come to Europe.  
 The AIS is the Automatic Identification System that is used for tracking vessels at sea in real time. Vessels are oblig18 -
ed to use AIS equipment. This allows authorities to have a real-time picture of maritime traffic. 
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With the launch of the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) in October 2016, saving migrant 
lives has been explicitly described in Frontex documents in terms of search and rescue operations. 
In the Regulation of the newborn EBCG, the “technical and operational assistance in the support of 
search and rescue operations for persons in distress at sea”  is listed as part of border management 19
and border security strategies. Notably, the support to search and rescue operations is conceived 
within the framework of border control at the external frontiers of Europe and “surveillance” is the 
accepted term used to refer to a de facto much wider array of possible activities”  (Carrera, Den 20
Hertog, 2015: 10). More practically, the boundaries between rescuing migrants and intercepting mi-
grant vessels, that is between rescue and capture or containment, are in fact more and more blurred.  
Rather, the number of migrants rescued and taken to Europe become part of the information and 
data collected for the “vulnerability assessment”  that the European Border Guard and Coast Guard 21
is in charge of conducting regularly, and EUROSUR plays a role as the main archive used for eval-
uating states’ border vulnerability .  22
If we explore the meaning of “risk” that underpins EUROSUR (and JORA) visualisations, we see 
that it is defined by Frontex through three meanings: “threat, vulnerability and impact”, and thus 
risk in the context of migration monitoring maps is related to the border stress that affects a frontier 
– in the present or potentially. Risk is conceived as potential pressure on the border that is visual-
ised on these maps. Border security itself is defined through risk management: the forms of visual-
isation produced by EUROSUR and JORA stage spaces that are composed of changeable variables 
(the migratory events) and that should be managed accordingly, more than presenting migration as a 
threat in itself and migrants as enemies. Unlike traditional migration maps which depict “migration 
flows” as arrows pointing to Europe, these systems provide a much more nuanced representation of 
migration as a phenomenon to be managed by focusing on critical migration hotspots and on migra-
tion routes: in the scenarios visualised, the component of future and present potential risk could 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Legal_basis/European_Border_and_Coast_Guard.pdf 19
 The role of EUROSUR fades into the background: the utility of EUROSUR in detecting migrant vessels in distress is 20
only mentioned in passing in Frontex news. It is in fact through national coast radar networks, migrant SOAS calls as 
well as through radar implemented on the Navy vessels that migrant boats in distress are detected.,
 Vulnerability assessments provide information about member states’ “capacities and readiness to […] deal with pos21 -
sible large numbers of arrivals of migrants at their borders as well as their contingency plans on border 
management”.https://www.montesquieu-instituut.nl/id/vk83d62wolwe/nieuws/questions_answers_the_new_european?
ctx=vjxejzh2cepg&tab=1
 https://www.montesquieu-instituut.nl/id/vk83d62wolwe/nieuws/questions_answers_the_new_eu22 -
ropean?ctx=vjxejzh2cepg&tab=1 
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never be eradicated once for all and, consequently, requires a versatility in governmental responses. 
The monitoring activity – visibility as the act of sight – is effectively in real-time, while visualisa-
tion is not; and not even the rationality of intervention that, as I illustrated above, is in fact future-
oriented. Relatedly, security is in a way deferred to a near future but grounded on mapping activities 
conducted in real-time: for setting preventive strategies and responding to future migratory risk, 
migrations and the changes in the logistics of crossing need to be constantly monitored. 
However, it is not  in terms of “threat” and of “migrant invasion” that these systems produce and 
visualise the events on the map, but, rather, on the basis of the degree of governability of every 
single migratory event. The migrants’ presence is translated into abstract dots and lines that have 
little to do with the materiality of migrant vessels arriving in Europe, nor with the border spectacle 
produced through the images that circulate in the media. Migration is crafted as a phenomenon to 
govern in which “the sovereign order is no longer simply that of decision, but also that of imagina-
tion” (Aradau, et al. 2008: 152). This means that it is less a question of responding to a specific se-
curity-threat than of setting out a space of governmentality that assesses migration impact factors 
and is simultaneously equipped for tackling migration as a crisis. In this sense, we can speak of a 
pre-emptive character of future-oriented maps. The spaces of intervention are envisaged building on 
migration trends grasped through EUROSUR and JORA’s archival function and, at the same time, 
by enforcing states’ preparedness in the face of potential but not fully determinable “migration 
risks”. These latter are defined at the level of object (migrants themselves) but cannot be fully cal-
culated in their actual reality (changes in migration routes, future migrant composition). Import-
antly, migration is assumed as a factor of crisis, that is a structural phenomenon, and not a mere 
emergency, that however constantly generates new scenarios of risk that are not fully predictable. 
The migrant condition that is often associated with clandestinity and invisibility – strategically 
played out by migrants and generated by migration laws – is at the same time characterised by a 
pervasive visibilisation of the subjects at different scales – e.g. close up visibility through identifica-
tion procedures, visibility at distance through monitoring systems. In a way, the paradox of “irregu-
lar” migration, forced to constantly move on the sly, consists in the condition of being the hypervis-
iblised subjects par excellence. That said, the regime of visibility being at stake in migration gov-
ernmentality cannot be analysed in terms of a disciplinary-panopticon gaze (Tazzioli, Walters, 
2016). By disciplinary-panopticon gaze I refer to an operation of constant monitoring, aimed at 
producing a generalised surveillance and generating  “a state of conscious and permanent visibility 
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that assures the automatic functioning of power” (Foucault, 1995: 129). As the above illustration of 
EUROSUR and JORA shows, what is generated through these monitoring systems in the Mediter-
ranean is less border surveillance than the visualisation, deferred in time, of migration risk scenari-
os. Actually, real-time border surveillance is not absent in the activities of JORA and EUROSUR 
but it is functional to the production of data-archives apt for generating migration risk scenarios.  
Although it goes beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the politics of visibility at play in the 
Mediterranean, it should be noted that the spectrum of visibility that the systems for tracking and 
archiving migration movements generate is by no means an overall picture of the Mediterranean. 
This aspect is directly related with the archival and preemptive functions of JORA and EURO-
SUR’s maps. Even if EUROSUR has been promoted as system for generating a situational aware-
ness picture, actually the data and information stored are not used for generating detailed maps rep-
resenting all migratory events but for visualising quite abstract spaces in which single migration 
incidents are taken into account or determining the risk level of a certain frontier. 
The technical limits of surveillance tools have been explicitly addressed in the EU document pro-
posing the creation of Eurosur (2008) . Most of the time “illegal” migration movements at sea are 23
not detected directly but are discovered as “anomalies”  grasped within the normal flow of mari24 -
time traffic through the “Anomaly Detection Service”, which is based on the use of algorithms and 
managed by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) . Yet, beyond technical limits, map25 -
ping-monitoring devices are grounded on a highly selective regime of visibility, in terms of what is 
looked at, as well as for the desultory time pace of visibility. What is monitored are only migratory 
events of concern – “irregular” border crossings and border crime activities – and what is then visu-
alized is a translation of those events into mapping codes according to the level of impact of each of 
those events. The desultory time pace of mapping depends both on the uneven time of latency be-
fore  an event is visualized, and on the fact that for a migratory event to occur this has to be detec-
ted by monitoring tools – in other words, border crossing movements become “events” only insofar 
as they are seen and clash with power's eyes. 
“Satellites are useful for monitoring and intelligence gathering with regard to pre-defined areas, but are currently of 23
limited use for tracking” Examining the creation of a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), COM 2008 
(68) final. 
For instance, an anomaly is observed when coastal radar detects a vessel that is not visible in the VMS system (http://24
ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/control/technologies/vms/index_en.htm). This means that the vessel in question operates 
without activating GPS function in order to remain invisible. 
 It is the European Maritime Safety Agency that provides services and technical support to Frontex for detecting 25
anomalies (Interview with EMSA officer, October 17, 2016).
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Conclusion: 
The spy, track and archive functions performed by migration mapping software are put to work by 
Frontex for generating a "vulnerability assessment” of member states and producing future oriented 
migration risk scenarios that take migrants less as an eradicable threat than in terms of a constitutive 
“crisis”. Through an analysis of the temporalities of visibility that are at stake in the government of 
migration at a distance, this article has shown that migration mapping-monitoring software is not 
conceived for performing border surveillance but for crafting future spaces of governmentality. As 
Julien Jeandesbodz has argued, EUROSUR has contributed to relevant shifts in the way in which 
border security is conceived, both at the level of the space “where controls occur”, and because it 
tries to “anticipate both geographically and temporally on border crossings, by categorising circula-
tions according to their degree of ‘risk’” (Jeandesbodz, 2011: 4). Thus, border controls and national 
sovereignty part ways (Basaran, 2008; Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013) while the function of control itself 
scatters across space and time. In a related way, not only are techniques of control “much less vis-
ible than police working on the front lines of border control” (Bigo, 2008: 21); rather, control turns 
out to be recast in terms of the crafting of spaces of governmentality envisaged from the combina-
tion of the archival function – which stores and elaborates on migration trends – and of a preempt-
ive temporality of security. Ultimately, even more than a question of border displacement beyond 
the geopolitical frontier-lines, these migration monitoring-mapping systems are less concerned with 
securing borders (border surveillance) or with generating new borders beyond the national ones, 
than with producing spaces and crafting scenarios of risk.  
How does such a track-and-archive gaze bear on migrants? What are the effects that these kinds of 
mapping software generate on migrant lives? EUROSUR and JORA function at a certain level of 
secrecy; they are therefore unknown to the migrants. As a consequence, despite the fact that the 
EUROSUR and JORA officers claim to be aiming at a deterrence effect, therefore discouraging the 
migrants’ engagement in the crossing, the migrants are rarely aware of the existence of this map-
ping software. In fact, as this article has shown, the track-and-archive gaze, which strives to detect 
migrants in real time, does not intervene on the spot – by blocking or saving migrants – and is in-
stead predicated upon a deferred temporality of security. Migrants’ chances of crossing the Mediter-
ranean and reaching Europe are more or less higher depending on being spotted by the multiplicity 
of technological eyes that watch the Mediterranean – such as radar and satellites. Being seen can 
mean being pushed back on the high sea, or being saved and ferried to Europe, or being rescued and 
taken back to Libya. The potential traps of rescue operations correspond to the constitutive reversib-
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ility of visiblity, as a battlefield migrants strategically engage with, trying to dodge controls and re-
main invisible or calling instead national authorities in order to be rescued.  As the Italian Coast 
Guard  reveals, the tactical choices that migrants engage with, either trying to be detected in order 
to be rescued or crossing the Mediterranean on the sly, also depend on a temporal dimension: if mi-
grants send out an SOS call too early, that is while they are still in Libyan waters, they are rescued 
by the Libyan Coast Guard and taken back to Libya. Thus, the temporality of security is strategic-
ally played out by migrants themselves, well beyond the punctual moment of the rescue and the 
binary opposition between being seen or not being detected. Nevertheless, the possibilities for mi-
grants to strategically appropriate and twist the real-time visibility produced by technological eyes 
as well as the role of monitoring devices should not be overstated. The unprecedented number of 
shipwrecks, due also to states’ failure to assist migrants in distress, and the push-back operations at 
sea made by the Libyan Coast Guard that return migrants to Libya as a result of the most recent 
agreements with Italy, highlight that migrants are not in a mere face-to-face relationship with secur-
ity devices that try to spy on them. Forms of administrative violence, political and legal struggles 
over the duty of rescue, bilateral state agreements to hamper migrants from crossing, and monitor-
ing technologies shape the Mediterranean Sea as a space of  fractured governmentality: far from 
being a natural deadly frontier, it is laboriously produced as a space of migration containment.  
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